

# **The Philosophical Position of Kant Between Neo-Kantians and Heidegger**

## **Kantian Critique as *ProteMetaphysica***

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## **Abstract**

This study is based on a comparison of two interpretations which have been developed on Kant's philosophy. The first of these interpretations belongs to Heidegger and claims that Kant's philosophy is fundamentally an ontology, moreover a fundamental ontology based on the analysis of finite human whatness. He grounds this claim by arguing that Kantian criticism constitutes the subjectivity of the subject in a temporal context. Thus, the Kantian representation of the subjectivity of the subject emerges almost as an analytic of Dasein. The second interpretation belongs to the Marburg school of the Neo-Kantian tradition. According to this interpretation, Kant's philosophy is an epistemology of the mathematical natural sciences. In this context, the Kantian dichotomy of intuition and understanding must be modified in favor of understanding. Because Kant's philosophy contains the pure principles of natural sciences, and in this context, the function of understanding as a lawgiver of nature comes to the fore. Rather than the philosophical correctness of these two interpretations, our study focuses on the possibilities that allow these two opposite interpretations to emerge from Kant's philosophy. In this context, the thesis is that Kantian philosophy is neither an ontology nor an epistemology. Kantian critique is a primary metaphysics, a *protometaphysica*, which itself enables a representation such as epistemology or ontology.

**Keywords:** Epistemology; Heidegger; neo-kantians; ontology.

## INTRODUCTION

Between 17 March and 6 April 1929, a philosophy event was held in the city of Davos, Switzerland, entitled "International University Course". The event was sponsored by the Swiss, French and German governments. French and German intellectuals, academics and philosophy students came together through this activity. Among these attenders was Carnap, who later made the most efficient criticism from the logical-positivist front to Heidegger's text of the ceremony course, in 1929, at Freiburg, which was entitled "What is Metaphysics?". A discussion on Kant between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger made the event a historical fact. Both philosophers gave a few lessons to internationally invited attenders, and then they performed their famous debate.

Cassirer and Heidegger had an active and prominent position in Germany until this notable debate which has gone down as an influential event in the history of philosophy. Cassirer was a major Kantian scholar and editor of the standard edition of Kant's works. His main work, the publication of the three-volume, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, has been completed. Heidegger also had lately published *Being and Time* and getting became a new pioneer of the phenomenological movement with his professor Husserl. He even started to get a position that was more prominent than Husserl. After this debate in Davos, Cassirer assumed the Rector of the University of Hamburg and became the first Jew selected for this position in a German university. Heidegger besides published his main work on his Kant interpretation, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Thus, he completed his Kant project which he could not achieve in *Being and Time* and he presents a summary and clues of it in Davos.

The fact that the debate is ascribed to historical importance is not the personal encounters between these two philosophers and their intellectual discussion skills. What the encounter and conflict in the personality of these two philosophers were two basic and effective interpretations of Kant's philosophy. One of the interpretations was the Neo-Kantian, or more precisely, Marburg, which is one of the schools of the Neo-Kantian tradition, and in the debate, it was represented by Cassirer. Cassirer objectively holds the position of being a representative of the Neo-Kantian tradition in the discussion, although he seems to have been stripped away from the context of the scientific knowledge theory of this school through the theory of culture philosophy. The Marburg school, in summary, interprets Kant's philosophy as an epistemology. According to this interpretation, Kant's philosophy is a theory of knowledge that reveals the

method of nature and mathematical sciences, and the main point that it concentrates on is the transcendental logic section of the first critique. This interpretation pushes aside the function of intuition in forming the process of cognition as an independent faculty and tries to dissolve it in understanding. The sensibility-understanding equation which Kant determines is disarranged in favor of understanding.

Heidegger strongly opposes this interpretation. According to Heidegger's interpretation, Kant's transcendental philosophy is certainly not a theory of knowledge that can be internalized into the method of natural and mathematical sciences. The philosophy of Kant and its CPR, in particular, is an ontology. Moreover, it is a fundamental ontology in the sense of laying a foundation for metaphysics. Fundamental ontology is concerned with the finite structure of the human essence, and Kant has attempted to put forward a metaphysical project that is fully compatible with the knowledge of being of beings. The formulation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge is the form of establishing the ontological basis of the ontic and establishing the ontological basis that determines the ontic research from the beginning, in accordance with the metaphor of the Copernican revolution. On the other hand, in terms of forming cognition and cooperation, both sensibility and understanding are based on a temporal-ontological soul structure, which is determined as the power of imagination. In this context, Heidegger establishes his ontological interpretation on the structures of power of imagination, schematism, and apperception by following the open-ended clues left by Kant, and tries to demonstrate that the fundamental spiritual power that determines the content of all these structures is temporality. In this sense, temporality appears as the essential effect that determines the ontology of the subject which establishes the ontological pre-method of ontic research with synthetic *a priori* knowledge. Therefore, there are two aspects of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology. The first is synthetic *a priori* knowledge as ontological knowledge, which occurs as a prerequisite for ontic research and determines it before turning towards beings. The second aspect is the revelation of temporality, which is a power that enables the establishment of the subjectivity of the subject that constitutes this information in the power of imagination, schematism, and apperception structures. In other words, ontology has a meaning that refers to both the method that the subject produces while turning towards the beings and the powers that reveal this method in the structural establishment of the subject.

What inspires this study in the symbolic context of the debate is the possibilities that led to these two opposite interpretations coming out of Kant's philosophy. This work tries to trace the question of “how can these opposite interpretations come out from the Kantian philosophy?” and in doing so, it will not stop trying to determine which of these two interpretations is more correct in the philosophical sense. If the philosophy of Kant is a theory of knowledge, as interpreted by the neo-Kantian tradition, and it is also a theory of knowledge that will provide a method for the natural sciences, what are the elements and foundations that enable it in Kant? Even if these elements and foundations are eliminated, can they be based on formulating Kant in such an interpretation? Can the two elements, sensibility, and understanding, which are indispensable for Kant in constituting knowledge, evolve into a view that gives importance to understanding, as the neo-Kantian tradition does? Kant's philosophy, on the other hand, is fundamentally an ontology, as Heidegger has interpreted it? Do the possibilities enabling Heidegger to interpret Kant in this manner make this interpretation valid? Does Heidegger distort Kant, or does his interpretation carry Kant into the realm of his philosophy?

Through all these problems that arise, this study will reveal the basic points of both interpretations by performing its Kant reading. The opinions of the Marburg School of the Neo-Kantian tradition will be examined, and the approaches of the leading representatives of this school, Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Ernst Cassirer will be traced. The points on which Heidegger bases his ontological interpretation will be revealed and the transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic readings of both sides will be analyzed in this direction. Also, what the Copernican Revolution means and what it expresses in terms of these two interpretations will be put forward as another important point.

Any philosophical study, for sure, can determine the outcome from the outset. However, it can assume what kind of conclusions it might be likely to reach through the points it was based on from the beginning. The main purpose of this study is to determine which of these two interpretations uncovers a strict realm of knowledge for us in terms of the philosophy of Kant, but mainly to inquire about the possibilities that led these two interpretations to emerge from Kant's philosophy. Therefore, we can assume that while trying to find the whatness of Kant's philosophy and Kant's philosophical position between these two interpretations, this study can accept that it is neither an ontology nor an epistemology. We can consider from the outset the assumption that Kant's philosophy is essentially a metaphysics of method from which both

ontological and epistemological forms can be derived, or a *protometaphysica*, i.e. primary metaphysics, by invoking Aristotle's term *protephilosophia* to help. This refers to a type of pluralism of forms of method that allow us to determine our orientations towards both the subject and object ontologically or epistemologically from the outset, whether in the field of natural sciences or the social sciences. In this sense, Kant's critical philosophy can be seen as an *a priori* method of mobility and pluralism, which can be called to help, whether in the field of political theory, sociology, or in the philosophical foundations of the Natural Sciences, both in the epistemological and in the ontological context. This is why we prefer the term *protometaphysica* from the beginning and in an unscientific way by breaking away from its Aristotelian content.

### **The Ontological Interpretation of Heidegger**

Heidegger's ontological interpretation focuses primarily on what the concept of metaphysics is that Kant confronts and from what this traditional concept of metaphysics proceeds. As a result, through these questions, he asks why the laying ground of metaphysics in Kant becomes a critique of pure reason. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 3). In its traditional formation, metaphysics is divided into *metaphysicaspecialis* and *metaphysicageneralis*. *Metaphysicaspecialis* was subdivided into theology, cosmology and psychology. *Metaphysicageneralis*, on the other hand, emerged as an ontology that deals with beings "in general". However, Heidegger argues that a "overstepping" occurs in metaphysics. This overstepping is made possible by pure rational cognition that goes beyond the specific experience of particular beings with content. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 6) The grounding of metaphysics thus becomes the determination of the essence of *metaphysicaspecialis* because this is the cognition of supersensible beings. However, the cognition of the supersensible beings returns itself to the inner possibility of making beings apparent as beings. In this way it is revealed what the general comporting of the being is. It is precisely at this point that Heidegger refers to the section in the preface to the B edition of the CPR where Kant mentions what the natural scientists discover. The natural scientists operate according to a certain conception before the contingent observations of experience. This preliminary design contains necessary laws, and with these laws, natural researchers, as beings, answer questions about the field of nature. In this way, human questions to nature are answered according to the preliminary character of pure rational cognition. Let us remember from Kant. Galileo determines the weight of the balls before rolling them in the inclined plane. Torricelli found the exit velocity of a liquid in a container by moving a weight equal to a column of water,

which he knew in advance, into the air. Stahl added something to the metals and then withdrew them, oxidized them and turned them back into metals. Thus, Heidegger states that the previously projected plan of a nature predetermines the constitution of Being of beings. Thus, he argues that what makes ontic cognition of being possible is the preliminary understanding of the structure of Being, that is, ontological cognition. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 7). But mathematical natural science is exhausted on the condition of this relation of ontic and ontological cognition. That is, mathematical natural science reveals only the relation of ontic and ontological cognition and nothing more. Pointing to this condition does not solve the problem.

That is, the possibility in the ontic cognition of *metaphysicaspecialis* returns to the point of the possibility of ontological cognition determined by *metaphysicageneralis*. In this way, the "Copernican Turn" is reached. Human cognition does not conform to the objects. Conversely, objects are determined according to human cognition. Thus, the ontological cognition that makes ontic cognition possible is fundamentally present.

It is precisely at this point that Heidegger's interpretation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as the knowledge of Being of beings unfolds. But how should its inner possibility and correspondence be displayed in Kantian philosophy? Does the formulation of synthetic *a priori* knowledge as knowledge of Being of beings have a legitimate basis? That is the question. On the other hand, does synthetic *a priori* knowledge reveal the whatness of knowledge or does it reveal the subject's mode of knowledge of objects? Kant exemplifies synthetic *a priori* knowledge through mathematics and physical science. Let us take his well-known mathematical example as a basis. The proposition  $7+5=12$  is a synthetic *a priori* judgment. But what does this proposition have to do with ontological cognition? Why is this proposition, in terms of Heidegger's interpretation, a preliminary proposition concerning the structure of Being of beings? Kant's determination is obvious. When we analyze neither 7 nor 5 by backtracking, we cannot arrive at 12. In other words, in the combination of 7 and 5, the predicate 12 is not already included from the beginning. As Lange points out, if the proposition were analytic, counting would not be taught in schools. That is, the predicate to which the sum of 7 and 5 must necessarily be connected would not be explained. What makes the mathematical proposition synthetic here is that there is no relation based on identity between the sum of 7 and 5 and 12. Or there is no overlap of

whatness in these two elements that can be revealed by analysis. We are simply adding a predicate that is externally related to 7 and 5 independently of experience.

So how can one ground Heidegger's approach, which regards the preliminary cognition of Being of beings in this synthetic *a priori* proposition? It seems that Heidegger considers here the preliminary structure of mathematical science's activity of constructing and forming the world towards the Being of beings. All disciplines that deal with mathematical sciences display this approach toward beings. Domains such as engineering science and physical science have to work with mathematics. For example, when scientific Dasein wants to make use of nature, it acts according to the preliminary ontological structure of the mathematical sciences. When building a dam, it is calculated which rivers and streams are suitable. Calculations and measurements are made to provide electricity, agricultural irrigation and municipal water. The construction of the dam is done entirely according to the designs of engineering science. That is to say, the subject who wants to make benefit from nature acts according to the approach of ontological preliminary cognition towards beings in its relationship with nature.

Indeed, according to Heidegger, Kant reduced the problem of the possibility of ontology to the question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?". Ontic experience is preceded by the *a priori* mode of ontological cognition. According to Heidegger, Kant called the cognition that determines the quiddity of beings and, moreover, reveals the beings themselves synthetic cognition. Thus, the possibility of ontological cognition has been tied to the essence of *a priori* synthetic cognition. (Heidegger, 1997-1, 9).

However, Kant does not mention ontology when he is speaking of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. He only mentions the importance of reference to them in terms of limiting metaphysics. In other words, he argues that if metaphysics is to be possible as a science, it must operate with the scientific knowledge possessed by the sciences.

The question to be asked through this interpretation of Heidegger is this. While Heidegger identifies synthetic *a priori* cognition with ontological cognition, does he provide us with traces of this through his own philosophy? For example, can we trace synthetic *a priori* knowledge in "B&T" in relation to the knowledge of being of beings?



In Heidegger, there does not seem to be a determination that we can clearly trace. Heidegger's treatment of synthetic *a priori* knowledge on the plane of the ontologicality of what is ontic is based on his equating "*a priori*" with Dasein's preliminary attitude towards being and synthetic cognition with the whatness of beings. Of course, Kant's emphasis on the principles of pure cognition predetermining scientific research according to certain laws of reason through the light that flashes in the minds of natural scientists has a natural overlap with the context Heidegger presents. In other words, it seems that Heidegger is able to provide logistical support from Kant for his unfolding of the ontological difference. By reconciling ontological difference with synthetic *a priori* cognition, he both discovered the historicity of a particular opening in his own philosophy and contained this discovery as an affirmation of his own philosophy.

However, this determination still does not prove the legitimacy of Heidegger's identification of ontological knowledge with synthetic *a priori* knowledge. The philosophical task is to determine whether this connection is present in the philosopher's text as an inner possibility. This study will try to understand this determination through "B&T", but not in great detail. Let us recall the introduction of B&T. There, Heidegger treats the definitions of Being and argues that these definitions, far from revealing the conception of Being, leave it ambiguous. Being is the most general and universal concept. It is self-evident. Therefore, Being cannot be defined. It is also clear within that propositional activity. It is precisely at this point that Heidegger opens a parenthesis. These prejudices that reveal that an enigma lies *a priori* in every comporting we make with beings as beings. (Heidegger, 1985, 23). It is interesting that Heidegger uses the concept of *a priori* here. There is an *a priori* enigma in the relation established with beings. Why is it *a priori*? He could have said that it is just an enigma. That is to say, our comportment and situations towards the beings contain a dark but *a priori* element. Precisely for this reason, the question of Being does not limit itself to aiming at the conditions of possibility of the sciences that operate within a certain understanding of Being, but aims at the conditions of possibility of the ontologies that precede and underlie the ontic sciences. (Heidegger, 1985, 31). So here, one might ask the following question? Is Dasein *a priori*? Does Heidegger, who emphasizes the preparatory analyticity of Dasein throughout the whole work, make synthetic *a priori* knowledge and the knowledge of Being of beings identical through the preliminary compartment of Dasein towards being?

Indeed, Heidegger states that the interpretation of Dasein is not a determination of the *a priori*, which consists in the combination of separate pieces, but a structure that is essentially and constantly whole. (Heidegger, 1985, 65). He adds that in Dasein's state of everydayness and inauthenticity, too, lies *a priori* the structure of existentiality. (Heidegger, 1985, 69). That is, Dasein, as the bearer and thinker of about Being, always acts in a preliminary structural totality, that is, *a priori*, in its attitude towards beings.

Indeed, for Heidegger, if the question "What is man?" is to be philosophically investigated, the very *a priori* that needs to be made visible must be uncovered. (Heidegger, 1985, 71). Dasein's determinations of Being must be seen and understood as *a priori* above the constitution of Being, for example through 'Being-in-the-world'. (Heidegger, 1985, 78). On the other hand, worldhood as an ontological concept is, according to Heidegger, modifiable according to the totality of the structure of special worlds and embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood. (Heidegger, 1985, 93). In other words, Dasein constructs the special worlds that it establishes in its existential motion and plurality of Being according to the preliminary being of worldliness, that is, according to its *a priori* character. Stating that the generally demanded subject of philosophy is not empirical facts but "*a priori*", Heidegger thinks that it is not enough to proceed from the ideal subject to fulfill this demand. Because proceeding from the ideal subject misses the *a priori* of the factual subject, Dasein. (Heidegger, 1985, 272).

What traces do Heidegger's interpretations in B&T leave us in terms of his identification of ontological knowledge with synthetic *a priori* knowledge? First of all, it should be noted that the *a priori* character of Dasein is grounded in its factual subjectivity. For it is this factual *a priori* that itself enables the *a priori* character of the ideal subject. All the states of Dasein that anticipate, concern, calculate, project into the future, and constitute being-in-the-world are realized under the encompassingness of its prioritizing attitude towards beings. In this sense, the entire *a priori* character of the epistemic subject emerges on the basis of the antecedent *a priori* character in the attitude of factual Dasein towards beings. Here, to be sure, Heidegger's recognition of an early Dasein analytic in Kantian subjectivity is also effective. Kantian subjectivity reveals beings as beings in a discovering manner through the constitution of Being. In this context, Heidegger considers in synthetic *a priori* knowledge not the essence of the constructive knowledge used instrumentally by the sciences, but the structurality of subjectivity's aprioritizing attitude towards objects that discovers beings as beings. Of course,

there is no distortion here, at least in terms of the activity of interpretation. Heidegger claims to have discovered the early historical foundations of the analytic of Dasein in Kant. Subjectivity places the structure of Being constituted by the conditions of sensibility and thinking into beings. Through this placement, the ontic experience of beings is established. In synthetic *a priori* judgment, subject entity and object entity are bound together by the *a priori* possibility of the ontological Being of subjectivity, and subject entity and object entity, which do not contain each other, are bound together through the act of judgment. Moreover, this context reveals the beings about which judgment is made in an explorative manner and reconstructs it in the context of beings as beings. This study does not consider this interpretation of Heidegger as a distortion. However, from the point of view of doctrinaire Kantianism, it can be interpreted as an overstepping of boundary. However, the following can be stated at this point. Kant defined synthetic *a priori* cognition as knowledge that extends our cognition. That is, it adds a new cognition to our cognition, a cognition that we do not acquire from ontic experience. Therefore, Heidegger's statement here that all kinds of truth are relative to the existence of Dasein is important. However, this relativity does not imply a subjectivity such as being at the arbitrariness of the subject. Dasein as the bearer and thinker of Being operates its Being as an ontological structuring possibility in the interconnection of ontic things. Therefore, the ontological knowledge of ontic things is under the determination of Dasein's antecedent understanding of Being. Dasein is not interested in the being of 7, 5 and 12 as mathematical beings. On the contrary, Dasein is the antecedent ontological existence of the attitude of discovering and revealing beings as beings in an activity of counting that results in 12. In this context, Dasein is the antecedent ontological existence that makes even something like *a priori* cognition possible.

The second focus of Heidegger's ontological interpretation was the finitude of human cognition. However, the unity of intuition and thinking constituted the basis of ontological knowledge. Heidegger, who considers the source ground of metaphysics in pure human reason, argues that it is precisely the essentiality of reason's humanness, its finitude, that belongs to this source ground. The finitude of reason is inherent in the very structure of cognition itself. It is this very structure that creates the factual limitation of knowledge. However, Heidegger's primary motivation is a statement in the chapter on transcendental aesthetics. It is intuition that all thought considers as a means. Through this statement of Kant, Heidegger argues that cognition is primarily intuition and that the faculty of understanding is at the service of intuition. Of

course, the thought of serving here creates an essential correlation between intuition and thinking. Heidegger's radical conclusion here is to assume a kinship between intuition and thinking. The fact that thinking serves what intuition aims at does not mean that they are separated by a sharp boundary, but rather that there is an essential relation between them. The kinship that emerges from the transitive nature of this reciprocal relation leads Heidegger to conclude that cognition is thinking which intuits. However, intuition still retains its dominance over thinking.

The representability of beings under a general perspective is derived from the intuitable itself. The function of the faculty of understanding at this point is to provide the mode by which the particular content of the intuitable is valid for many things under an all-embracing unity.

In other words, if intuition is the primary structure of relating to objects as a singular representation, the faculty of understanding provides the form of the concept. Just as the object given in intuition becomes accessible and receptive under the determination of pure forms of intuition, thinking also constitutes the field of objectivity, which is the executer of object-ness, by giving a determination to the determined object of intuition, through its bringing forward representation. Heidegger argues that the essence of the faculty of understanding is originary conceiving. The faculty of understanding already contains in itself representations of unity as representational unification. This unity is the content of pure concepts. Heidegger argues that the whatness content of these concepts is every unification that makes unification possible. In fact, Heidegger wants to emphasize the following here. The determination from the faculty of understanding towards intuition is the representation of unity which is found *a priori* in the faculty of understanding. The pure concept as a unifying unity is not the provider of the concept form but is fundamentally this form itself. That is, in the inner relation of intuition and understanding, the determination included in the relation by the understanding is the form-forming action of pure concepts, the pure unity that unites the contents. While the faculty of understanding serves what intuition aims at, it incorporates intuition into the context of object-ness, which it constitutes with the form of pure unity as the content of pure concepts.

The point to be noted here is this. The fact that none of the properties of intuition and thinking are preferable to the other jumps to another context with the proposition that they have an unknown common root. For Heidegger, this unknown root lies in the concept of synthesis.

Synthesis is not a factor that combines these two sources randomly and side by side, on the contrary, it is the enabling root of their inner connection. Synthesis brings intuition and thinking into unity on the plane of belonging to each other. The main conclusion that can be drawn from here is this. Although intuition is primary in terms of human cognition according to Heidegger, it nevertheless finds a sense of belonging and inner coherence on the basis of the unity achieved through the act of synthesis. As a result of this inner harmony, intuition and thinking are characteristically not to be seen as sources that must be strictly separated from each other; on the contrary, they undergo a hybridization in the field of synthesis.

The third pillar of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology is the inquiry of transcendental deduction. First of all, the inquiry into deduction is different in the first and second editions. Heidegger prefers the inquiry in the first edition.

Kant based his inquiry of transcendental deduction on three subjective sources of knowledge: sense, imagination, and apperception. He defined the synthesis of these faculties as the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in concept. But all synthesis is under the encompassing formality of time. For all representations, whether empirical or *a priori*, stand under the formal condition of the inner sense, that is, under time. In the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the mind represents the manifold in intuition as a manifold by distinguishing time. That is to say, the manifold given in intuition is apprehended in unity by placing it in the pure formal succession of time. The synthesis of reproduction in the imagination accomplishes the continuity of the relation between the previous phase and the next phase in the pure phases of succession by retaining the previous phase. The synthesis of recognition in concept is to bring this whole process to unity through the mediation of the identity of the previous phase and the next phase. It is the unity of consciousness that enables this. Because without this consciousness, all reproduction in the series of representations would be futile.

In the chapter on deduction in the B edition of the CPR, the situation changes. Here it is stated that synthesis as unification cannot be found in the pure forms of sensible intuition. In this context, the act of synthesis is not assigned to subjective sources but to the faculty of understanding. However, there is a ground of unity that precedes the concept of unification and makes the synthesis of the manifold possible. This ground is the synthetic unity of the subject's

consciousness, that is, pure apperception. The representation that characterizes apperception is "I think". Because all representations of the subject are at the same time what is thought by the subject.

However, Heidegger thinks differently about the meaning and task of transcendental deduction. For Heidegger, the threefold synthesis is not a process of synthesis executed separately by pure intuition, pure imagination, and pure concept. For the synthesis at work in all three stages reveals the inner possibility of the essential unity of pure cognition. The subjective interpretation of transcendental deduction exemplifies the subject's pure act of bringing forth something within the horizon of object-ness.

Heidegger relates the synthesis of apprehension in intuition to the now. For while the manifold in empirical intuition is unified through the pure temporal form of succession, each phase of succession is revealed as a 'now' phase of the mind. The mind assembles the manifold of impressions by passing through the nows.

For Heidegger, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is a kind of unification as retrieval. For our mind does not lose in its thought what is to be brought back again. This synthesis therefore takes place in the mode of retention. So the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is the unification of the no-longer-now with the relevant now. Heidegger therefore formulates the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination as 'past' in the context of what has been. If time is the triple unity of now, past, and future, the temporal character of recognition in the concept will be revealed as the future.

According to Heidegger, this mode of synthesis, which constitutes the third element of pure knowledge, requires a thorough analysis. The reason for this is that Heidegger also considers a temporal character in this mode of synthesis. However, Kant did not exhibit a temporal unfolding in the synthesis of recognition in concept.

So how is the time character revealed in this third mode of synthesis? The critical point here is this. Just as the synthesis of apprehension in intuition is tied to the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, the synthesis of recognition in concept is tied to the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. For in the first sentence of the synthesis of recognition in the concept, Kant

states that the consciousness that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before is the provider of all reproduction in the series of representations. Heidegger proceeds from this determination and tries to justify that reproduction in the imagination is not possible without the synthesis of recognition in the concept. If the first two modes of synthesis are time-related and the third mode of synthesis has an inner unity with these two modes of synthesis, this shows that the synthesis of recognition in the concept is also time-related.

In the interpretation of the first two syntheses, Heidegger adhered to the inner possibilities in Kant's presentation. However, in the interpretation of the third mode, the revealing and complementary activity of his phenomenological-ontological interpretation came into play. The main point of Heidegger's interpretation regarding the threefold synthesis is that it focuses on the inner dialectical relation of the three modes of synthesis. These three modes of synthesis are the subjective sources of the objective reality of categories. Despite the undecided movement of Kantian criticism, the objective reality of the category is connected to the element of synthesis, the element of synthesis to the power of imagination, and the power of imagination to comprehension. On the other hand, the threefold synthesis should be considered under the representation of time according to the instruction given by Kant himself at the beginning. It is a natural consequence that Heidegger, who regards the essence of ontological knowledge in the inner unity of pure intuition and pure concept, interprets the threefold synthesis as the dialectical relation between the modes of temporal unity. The fact that the synthesis of recognition as an activity of the faculty of understanding is grounded in the context of temporal relation shows that the origin of categories is also time.

The fourth pillar of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology, which gains priority in terms of importance, is the faculty of imagination and schematism. Heidegger's motivation here is again the element of synthesis. And the faculty of imagination is the root and bearer of the act of synthesis in this context. Heidegger argues that the synthesis of the faculty of imagination is the root element that constitutes the unity of pure intuition and pure concept.

Here the doctrine of schematism acquires a distinct authenticity. Heidegger regards in transcendental schematism the making-sensible method of pure concepts. Here, the act of letting-stand-against is in question. This means that the faculty of pure understanding is based on pure intuition. Therefore, according to Heidegger, pure sensibilization occurs as schematism.

On the other hand, the difference between schema and image implies this. The image is the representation of the plural image of the particular. The schema, on the other hand, presents the unity of the general rule of various particulars by gathering them under one rule. Therefore, Heidegger sees the possibility of the image in the representation of the rule of exhibition. Thus, as Kant says in [CPR A140/B180], our pure sensible concepts are not based on images of objects but on schemas. Schema-forming sensibilization provides the image for the concept. Concepts of pure understanding need making-sensible if they are to be revealed as an ontological unity. They are not closed absolutes of the faculty of understanding as pure notions, but constructive potentialities with content that are captured in appearances through schemas. For subjectivity must confront the ontological cognition consisting of the unification of pure intuition and pure concept within the horizon of being pure stand-against to correspond to its experience. In his interpretation of transcendental deduction, Heidegger had seen the ontological unity of the pure concept with pure intuition through temporal determination. However, schematism places this unity in time by placing the concepts of the pure faculty of understanding in time by subjecting them to rules. Accordingly, for Heidegger, transcendental schematism is the basis of the inner possibility of ontological cognition. What is represented in pure thinking makes itself intuitable in the pure image of time. That is, by utilizing the difference and repetition of temporal relations, the possibility of capturing pure concepts in appearances is realized, moreover, the capture of the category in the appropriate appearance. For example, the schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time. According to Kant, time does not elapse, but the existence of the changeable in it does. In other words, it gives the change temporally relative to the non-elapsing of time. Therefore, in fact, time makes us sense the existence of the changeable in itself through its own unchangeability. The category that we appropriate to this sensation in appearances is substance. The substance can be captured in appearances by the non-elapse of time, that is, by the scheme of persistence that can be derived from the structure of the *substratum* of time. The carrier of the scheme of persistence corresponding to the substance in appearances is the real.

### **The Epistemological Interpretation of Neo-Kantians**

We will now try to deal with the texts of the Neo-Kantian Marburg school. Cohen's "KTE" and "LRE" and Natorp's "Kant and the Marburg School" stand out here as characteristic texts of Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, Cassirer's critique of Heidegger will also be included in our analysis.



Let us start with Cohen. Cohen, who sets the main task of his interpretation of Kant as to re-establish Kant's *a priori* doctrine, argues that the point to be considered in Kantian philosophy is a new concept of experience (Cohen, 1871, III). Kant does not give a definition of experience in the introduction to CPR. He only states that knowledge cannot be fundamentally restricted to the context of experience. All knowledge begins with experience, of course, but this does not mean that experience alone is the source of all knowledge. According to Cohen, this beginning leaves the concept of experience as an enigma. And the content of Kant's philosophy depends on the solution to this enigma (Cohen, 1871, 3-4). While Cohen undertakes to re-establish the concept of *a priori*, he proposes to focus on its internal criterion and not on its external value. As is well known from CPR, the concept of *a priori* is characterized as generally valid and necessary. However, Cohen argues that these predicates do not reveal the concrete content of the concept of *a priori*. These predicates only describe the external value of the concept of *a priori* (Cohen, 1871, 10). According to Cohen, the concept of *a priori* is integrated with another concept that complements and realizes it. This is the concept of the transcendental. The complementary relation between the transcendental and the *a priori* will reveal the essential context of the Kantian *a priori* doctrine.

Cohen determines that there are three stages of the *a priori*. These three stages reveal the inner structure of the concept of *a priori*. Cohen grounds the first stage of the *a priori* with the second proposition of the exposition of the concept of space in the chapter on transcendental aesthetics. This proposition refers to the origin of the concept of space. The subject can represent a space in which there are no objects. But it can never represent there is no space. Space is therefore put into the context of experience by the subject. That is, space is an *a priori* representation, since the *a priori* resides in the subject originally. According to Cohen, this is the first stage of the concept of *a priori* (Cohen, 1871, 13).

Cohen grounds the second stage of the *a priori* in the revelation of the *a priori* as form. It is the subject's forms of sensibility that enable the subject to come into contact with objects under spatial and temporal relations. This is the basis that reveals the formal character of the *a priori*. According to Cohen, this foundation is essentially in line with Kant's conception of what *a priori* is in the preface to the second edition of the CPR. We know *a priori* about things only that which we put into them. What is revealed through this second phase of the concept of *a*

*priori* is that the subject puts the form of sensibility into things. Here, however, the Kantian meaning of the term form should be clarified. According to Cohen, Kant does not mean by the term form an organ in which sensations are filled and then transformed, but a mode and type of appearances. However, these two stages of the *a priori* as laid out by Cohen, namely its origin and its being a form of subjective sensibility, seem to strengthen the relation between the *a priori* and innateness. According to Cohen, this problem is solved by the third stage of *a priori*. This is because, according to Cohen, the *a priori* being of space is not based on the fact that it underlies all experience as a formal structure of sensibility. On the contrary, the *a priori* being of space lies in the fact that the intuition of space is recognized as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. What characterizes the concept of *a priori* in this third stage is that it is the formal condition of the possibility of experience. If *a priori* were an innate property, we would be assuming a force or deterministic genetics that implanted it in human beings before they were born. On the other hand, we would be formulating *a priori* as a temporal priority. However, the subject operates *a priori* knowledge within the context of possible experience, and the *a priori* is logically prior. In other words, while constructing possible experience, the subject operates simultaneously with experience but with a structure that perceptually and conceptually prioritizes experience. *A priori* knowledge is not the activation of principles that are already present in the man before experience begins. Rather, it is the knowledge that makes it possible for something like experience to begin. In other words, it is not an element that the subject adds to experience before the initial movement of experience, but the logical preliminary stage of the content established within the continuous movement of experience. Since we do not notice this preliminary stage in experience, we think of *a priori* as an innate property.

Another concept Cohen focuses on in KTE is the concept of the transcendental. Transcendental knowledge proves *a priori* knowledge as knowledge necessary for the possibility of experience. Kant describes as transcendental the knowledge that deals not with the objects themselves, but with our mode of knowledge of them insofar as they are *a priori* possible. Cohen thinks that the term transcendental, which is the complement of *a priori*, is made explicit here. If our mode of knowledge as *a priori* is called transcendental, this implies that it is possible to recognize the *a priori* in the transcendental mode of knowledge (Cohen, 1871, 36). The transcendental object as a mode of knowledge, whether intuition or concept, is nevertheless not concerned with the *a priori* object, but with our mode of knowing, of recognizing the object *a priori*. In other words,

the field where the *a priori* emerges as a possibility is transcendental knowledge. Because of this complementary relation between the transcendental and the *a priori*, the subject-object dichotomy is overcome. For the *a priori* knowledge of the subject is not knowledge of the object, but transcendental knowledge as the knowledge of knowing the object. This shows that the subject is not preoccupied with an object in opposition to itself, but with the manner in which its agency, which transforms the object within its own structure of knowing, is realized. Therefore, oppositions such as subjective-objective, object-concept, or possible-actual are resolved within the field of transcendental agency.

Although Cohen acknowledges the value of the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics, he assigns the subject's act of synthesis entirely to transcendental logic. According to this interpretation, the act of synthesis, which provides the synthetic connection of appearances, is not included in transcendental aesthetics. Transcendental aesthetics is complemented by transcendental logic, but the act of synthesis, the most important unfolding of critique, is located only in transcendental logic as a synthesis of concepts. That is, the doctrine of transcendental aesthetics has no independent meaning in terms of the principles of knowledge. The Kantian doctrine of sensibility is meaningful because of the complementary movement toward transcendental logic. The doctrine of transcendental logic should be taken as the complement and executor of the doctrine of sensibility. For space and time only acquire meaning if they are connected to a possible experience. A possible experience is realized under the execution of categories.

According to Cohen, the possibility of synthetic propositions is based on synthetic unity, and this synthetic unity is the category (Cohen, 1871, 109). Categories are determined as the root concepts of the faculty of understanding. However, these root concepts then deepen as forms of experience. In this context, the task of transcendental logic is to prove the possibility of judgments of experience. Just as space and time do not exist in sensations themselves, but rather are inserted from the subject into appearances, so the forms of connection in all judgments are fundamentally created concepts, that is, *a priori* forms of thinking. The objective validity of judgment is founded first and foremost on the concept of pure understanding. The meaning of pure understanding is unity in judgments.

So how does Cohen interpret transcendental deduction, one of the pillars of Heidegger's ontological interpretation? According to him, it is the task of transcendental deduction to prove

the correspondence between the elements of knowledge. Cohen argues that what constitutes the content of transcendental deduction is the return to the unity of consciousness and the demonstration of the process of knowledge, of the series of appearances, as a totality of experience.

It can be said that the main point of Cohen's interpretation of deduction and categories is about apperception. The a-priority of categories is essentially the synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of consciousness, which is the basis of the unity in the object. Just as space is the form of outer intuition and time is the form of inner intuition, transcendental apperception is the form of categories. In this context, the transcendental condition under which we produce the pure concepts of understanding is self-consciousness. Synthetic unity is the form that is the common basis of all the individual kinds of unities conceived in categories. Thus the objective unity of self-consciousness consists of the synthetic unity of representations under the category.

Although Cohen's interpretation of Kant that emerged in the KTE diverged somewhat from the radical approach in the "LRE", it laid the foundations for the epistemological and scientific interpretation of Neo-Kantianism in terms of its focus. It clarified the concept of *a priori* and dealt with the essential character of the transcendental on a new basis.

Let us now try to summarize Cohen's radical interpretation in his work "LRE" based on the foundation laid in KTE. The reason we prefer the term radical here is that Cohen radically rejects the Kantian dichotomy of intuition and thinking and reduces this dichotomy to the monism of thinking.

According to Cohen, logic is the logic of a system of philosophy. It is logic as the logic of pure knowledge that gives philosophy its systematic unity. The method of logic is based on pure thinking. However, according to Cohen, pure thinking does not refer to the purely formal. Pure thinking also produces its own content. In this context, pure thinking is formulated not as a coincide with the given object, but as the power that produces the given object itself.

Kant's metaphysics is based on Newton's system of principles. Consequently, according to Cohen, Kant's metaphysics is based on the system of nature. The section on transcendental logic constitutes the positive side of the CPR as the grounding of the mathematical natural sciences.

However, the prioritization of the doctrine of sensibility over the doctrine of logic is a major mistake. The reason that led Kant to this mistake was his opportunist position against English empiricism and Leibniz's legacy of a weak doctrine of sensibility (Cohen, 1922, 12). According to Cohen, treating the doctrine of sensibility as prioritizing the doctrine of logic causes inner damage to thinking. To conceive of intuition in the context of knowledge in a prioritizing position implies the inclusion of a foreign element in thinking. Cohen therefore firmly rejects the prioritization of logic by the doctrine of sensibility. Thinking has no origin outside itself. If such an origin is assumed, the independence of the thinking element is undermined (Cohen, 1922, 12).

According to Cohen, thinking is synthesis and synthesis is the synthesis of unity (Cohen, 1922, 25-6). The fatal mistake in the Kantian system is to assume a multiplicity in the act of synthesis that is not created by thinking but given to it. The roots of the basic orientation of neo-Kantian radicalism are clearly visible in Cohen's determinations. The first point to note concerns the determination of being "pure". The division of "purity" (Reinheit) between the elements of sensibility and thinking is considered an advance misdetermination that contradicts the essence of purity. In this sense, purity is primarily made immanent to the thinking element in an absolute sense. Pure knowledge, according to Cohen, is not empty content. Otherwise, it would be pure meaningless. The factor of sensibility, which we assume to be at work in the knowledge of the object, is the empirical result of the determining and constitutive activity of pure thinking. In other words, sensibility is not at the starting point of the movement of knowledge, but at the end point. Therefore, it does not have the origin of purity.

Let us now turn to Paul Natorp's interpretation. First of all, it should be noted that Natorp's interpretation parallels Cohen's interpretation and repeats the same radicalism. Natorp's article "Kant and the Marburg School" reveals a manner characteristic of Neo-Kantianism.

Stating that it is self-evident that there is a contentual consensus among the Neo-Kantians, Natorp identifies the "transcendental method" as the central point of Neo-Kantian interpretation (Natorp, 1912, 196). According to Natorp, the transcendental method as an immanent method establishes the law of objective formation and does not seek this lawfulness outside the field of objective formation.

Natorp holds that thinking in Kant emerges as a function, an action and as a production from the basis of infinity, that is, spontaneity. The faculty of understanding is not only the interpreter of nature but also the creator of nature as a legislative function (Natorp, 1912, 199). Natorp's thoughts so far summarize the common basis of Neo-Kantian thought. The emphasis is on the determination of Kantian criticism as a transcendental method. This indicates that criticism is basically a method that emerges in the way the object is known. Kantian philosophy provides an objective construction of humanity's collective sphere of thought and culture, and through this it investigates the laws of universal reason.

But the specific point of Neo-Kantianism's Kant interpretation is, of course, the relation between intuition and thinking. Natorp states that at the very beginning of the Critique, an old difficulty was encountered. According to Natorp, this difficulty arises from the opposition of intuition, which is a special type of givenness on the side of the object and receptivity for the subject, to spontaneity. According to him, this dualism in the context of knowledge means losing sight of the main idea of the transcendental method (Natorp, 1912, 201). In order to remove this dualism from the transcendental method, subjective receptivity and the givenness of sensation as the material of knowledge must also be suspended.

For Natorp, space and time are not sensible givennesses. Natorp argues that there is no givenness in spatial and temporal organization. For him, being given refers to being determined and is the act of thinking. Because for him, to think is to determine. Factuality, which is revealed through the determinateness of the object, can be realized through thinking. "Givenness" itself is the problem of thinking. Natorp refers to Kant's footnote in Chapter 26 of his inquiry into transcendental deduction in the second edition of the CPR. There Kant states that the faculty of understanding determines sensibility and it is through it that space and time are first given. According to Natorp, the systematic location of this functioning of the faculty of understanding as determining intuition is the modal category of actuality (*Modalitätskategorie der Wirklichkeit*). This category does not mean the result of knowledge, but only the condition of the possibility of experience. Thus, intuition is not found as a factor foreign to and opposed to thinking (Natorp, 1912, 204).

According to Natorp, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, which is determined as the perceptual positioning of the particular object, and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination

attain their final meaning in the synthesis of recognition in concept. What contextualizes the presence of the particular object in the process of perception is that absolute identity, that is, the determining thinking, encompasses them backward. That is to say, the intuitive phases that initially appear to be independent, as apprehension in intuition and reproduction in imagination, acquire meaning through the overarching function of the determining act of recognition. According to Natorp, in this context the distinctive character of intuition and sensation does not vanish. Only their being the second factor of knowledge disappears. The structure of intuition as alien to, independent of, and dominant over thought comes to an end. Intuitive givenness expresses the determination of experience and thus the determination of thinking. Therefore, what is given outside the determination of thinking (in intuition) is not what is actually given. It is the hypothesis set by thinking.

The main motivation for this idea, which emerged as a radical rejection of Kantian subjectivity, is to draw a sharp distinction between transcendental idealism and psychologism. Natorp thinks that at the level of knowledge, the object is revealed as the ultimate limit. In other words, there is no level that goes beyond the object in the context of knowledge. The construction of an objective field of knowledge leaves subjectivity behind and results in a dissolution of subjectivity. Because subjectivity is the subject of psychology. The underlying assumption here is that any type of object relation prioritizes the subject relation.

As a clear example of the basic approach of Neo-Kantianism, Cassirer's criticism of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant is also important. The first point Cassirer emphasizes is the minimum common context of Neo-Kantianism. The known representatives of Neo-Kantianism agree on this point: The focal point of Kant's system is the doctrine of knowledge, i.e. epistemology (Cassirer, 1931, 2).

The second point Cassirer criticizes Heidegger on is the issue of the finitude of human knowledge. Kant's usage of receptive human knowledge as being relative to *intuitus originarius* requires that this opposition be understood not as an absolutization of the finitude of human knowledge, but as a limiting concept against the assumptions of sensibility. For Cassirer, however, this is the starting point of the problematic content of his interpretation of Heidegger. According to Cassirer, tying the Kantian formulation of human knowledge to intuitive givenness as a central point of departure would necessarily confine all subsequent interpretation

to this point, which is what Heidegger does. However, Cassirer points out that Kant does not stop at the "receptivity of intuition". On the one hand, the "spontaneity of the faculty of understanding" is also firmly established in Kantian criticism. That is, the faculty of understanding is to be understood not as a refutation or abolition of the finite character of human knowledge, but as a particular characteristic of it (Cassirer, 1937, 7).

The limitation of the faculty of understanding indicates its true, creative power. The fact that the faculty of understanding is related to intuition does not mean that the faculty of understanding is at the service of intuition and works under its subordination, as Heidegger's basic thesis suggests. On the contrary, this relation is the positive force that produces all determinations and forms of intuition. It is the synthesis of the faculty of understanding that makes it possible for intuition to relate to an object and gives it a determinacy. The "objectness" (Gegenständlichkeit) attributed to knowledge is always an exercise of spontaneity, not receptivity. These views put forward by Cassirer are the basic approach of Neo-Kantianism. The existence of intuition as determined is realized through the activity of the faculty of understanding. Because there is no determination in intuition itself. Therefore, Neo-Kantianism considers the intuitive givenness of the object to be *pseudo* in itself and thinks that through the creativity of the determination directed from thought towards it, the intuitive givenness is made the object of knowledge. Formally, therefore, time is contextualized and "meaningful" through the determination of thinking. Cassirer states that the issue becomes even sharper when we move from transcendental analytic to transcendental dialectics. In the context opened by transcendental dialectics, we are now confronted with the idea of the unconditioned. And when it comes to the ideas of reason, there is neither imagination nor schematism. For Cassirer, this ground ultimately means that the spell of "receptivity" is broken (Cassirer, 1931, 12).

On the other hand, when we move into the realm of practical reason, we encounter a different context. Because with the "unconditional" context of the idea of freedom, one steps into the pure "intelligible", supersensible and timeless. Cassirer reinforces this change of relation, which is valid as far as the practical sphere is concerned, with a quotation from CPR B 431. Kant states that in the use of pure reason we are *a priori* law-giving (gesetzgebend) subjects in terms of our existence, and that the spontaneity that emerges from this position determines our actuality (wirklichkeit) without the need for the conditions of empirical intuition. Our sensible existence is thus determined in relation to the intelligible world (Intelligible Welt). It is quite



clear what Cassirer wants to say here against Heidegger. There is no intuition, imagination, or schema, i.e. temporal determination, at the stage where we can determine our existence solely by the law we set ourselves. This is because the unconditionality of the moral law elevates the subject above mere phenomenal being and engages it in an entirely different order by moving it to a center of its own. Cassirer thus comes to his main criticism of Heidegger's interpretation by showing our existence transcending the sensible and temporal condition in the context of dualism and the idea of freedom in Kantian thought. Heidegger links all faculties of knowledge to the transcendental imagination and traces them by going back to the transcendental imagination. He thus remains only in the given relation of temporal *Dasein*. The difference between phenomenon and noumenon is blurred and flattened, so that all existence is tied to the field of time and finitude. According to Cassirer, this approach means the collapse of the pillars on which Kant's thought is based. Kant did not present such a monism of the imagination within his system, but rather insisted on a radical and specific dualism, a dualism of the sensible and the intelligible. According to Cassirer, the systematic meaning and significance of the section on schematism cannot be denied, but the doctrines of schematism and transcendental imagination are not the focus of the Kantian system. The system is determined and completed in the transcendental dialectic in continuity and moreover in the "CPrR" and "CJ".

In this context, Cassirer argues that Heidegger's interpretation exposes a paradox. For Heidegger, it is a great misconception to treat Kant's philosophy as a "doctrine of experience". However, Cassirer argues that schematism and the doctrine of transcendental imagination are not the appropriate place to prove this thesis. Because, according to him, this doctrine is not a component of Kantian metaphysics, but a real and necessary element of the doctrine of experience. Schematism and imagination do not deal directly and fundamentally with Human *Dasein*, but with the conditions, quality and constitution of the empirical object. Therefore, Cassirer considers that schematism belongs essentially to the phenomenology of the object, not to the subject. Cassirer argues that the doctrine of schematism belongs to the epistemology that Heidegger rejects. According to him, despite all his care and attention, Heidegger compressed his complete analysis of Kant into a single point.

## **RESULTS**

Ontology is therefore first and foremost the unity of the dual source of knowledge of subjectivity. This unity of subjectivity coincides with the unity of ontological knowledge. In

other words, the unity of intuition-concept in ontological knowledge is based on the unity of intuition-concept achieved in the synthesis act of subjectivity. Indeed, to mention the possibility of an ontology is not to divide subjectivity into its parts on the ground of an ideal subjectivity, but to discover the originary unity that makes possible the ground of unity constitutive of the totality of the structure of subjectivity.

Kant first mentioned the two sources of our knowledge: sensibility and understanding. And interestingly, he argued that these two sources have a common root that is unknown to us. Later, in the first edition of the CPR of his inquiry of transcendental deduction, he mentioned three sources of subjective knowledge: sense, imagination and apperception. Moreover, he demonstrated that the synthesis process of these subjective sources of knowledge is the basis for the objective reality of categories. On the other hand, he emphasized the element of synthesis precisely in the section preceding the table of categories, and furthermore, he determined the element of synthesis as a product of the power of imagination. He inseparably connected the power of imagination to the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. In this way, he placed the threefold synthesis of subjective sources under the encompassing power of imagination. On the other hand, he revealed that the process of synthesis takes place entirely under the determination of time. Heidegger connected all these traces and interpreted the synthesis of subjective sources under the encompassing forward and backward progression of temporal determination.

According to Heidegger, the root of pure intuition and pure concept, which is common but unknowable to us, is synthesis. And synthesis is the execution of the faculty of imagination. This structure re-emerged as a method of rules in the doctrine of schematism through temporal determination. Therefore, the Kantian representation of the subjectivity of the subject is a unified ontology constituted in the context of original temporality.

So what is the connection between Heidegger's approach and the inner possibilities of CPR? First of all, according to Heidegger, Kantian subjectivity is an early design of Dasein. Although he accuses Kant of retreating from an early historical analytic of Dasein, he regards the analytic of the finite human essence, the object of fundamental ontology, as historically situated in Kantian criticism. In the CPR, the time factor comes into play in the crucial sections of the work from the transcendental aesthetic section onwards. Heidegger has seen in transcendental aesthetics the whatness of subjective *aisthesis*, that is, its ontological unfolding. In the elements

of transcendental deduction, imagination and schematism, he has seen the construction of the subjectivity of the subject under temporal determination. He has done so by resolving the tensions and filling the gaps left by the first edition of the CPR.

So what are the possibilities that Heidegger's ontological interpretation corresponds to in Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* means the unity of subjectivity. That is, subjectivity is a set of structure that emerge through the root that ensures the unity of its faculties. In other words, the structural totality of the subjectivity of the subject is a possibility offered to us by Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica*. For Heidegger, the carrier of this whole process is subjectivity, which contains the possibility of an ontological configuration such as being. Subjectivity establishes ontological knowledge through its temporal constitutive origin. Moreover, Kantian subjectivity as early Dasein projects its own structural unity into experience as the structural unity of ontological knowledge and constructs its experience. In other words, the possible experience is the construction of the ontological structural totality of the subject's subjectivity. *Prote metaphysica* offers us the inner possibility of ontology in its possible movement towards the mediation of subjectivity.

On the other hand, the approach of Cohen's interpretation is the essence of Neo-Kantian radicalism. The term radicalism is used here because Neo-Kantianism's fundamental rejection of the Kantian doctrine of sensibility is made the methodology of the interpretation. This methodology basically grounds itself in attributing the right of representation of the concept of purity to thinking as absolute. Purity is formulated essentially as the negation of intuitive givenness. Moreover, givenness is the facticity of experience, and this facticity is intrinsically unified with the determination of the thinking element. The produced content of intuition is already the external correspondent of this unity. For intuition or sensibility cannot be from the beginning or as already pure. Cohen tries to justify the reason for the negation of the purity of intuition not from intuition but from thinking. Purity as a common quality attributed to intuition and thinking is transformed into a tension through the assumption of the primordial purity of thinking, and the tension is resolved in the name of thinking by the principle of the primacy of the determining power of thinking. The guiding pure principles of mathematical natural science are brought into absolute correspondence with the Kantian elements of pure thinking, the categories. In this way, the provisional and complex nature of intuition is clarified relative to the principles of pure thinking.

Considering Natorp's text, it can be said that it is a characteristic example of Neo-Kantianism. Natorp first of all expels intuition from the Kantian context of knowledge and does so through the rejection of givenness. He considers that Kant's philosophy can be placed on the proper axis by shifting the equation of intuition and the faculty of understanding in favor of the faculty of understanding. He goes so far as to say that the relation between sensibility and thinking is a dogma inherited from Kant's professorial dissertation and transcendental aesthetics. It is clear from Natorp's approach to the thought that intuitive givenness and subjective receptivity have no place in the construction of objective knowledge. When the structure of knowledge is taken into account, introducing the element of intuition means that human knowledge is handled in terms of an element that is foreign and external to it. If the determination is only an act of thinking, there is no intuitive givenness that precedes it. For the object is not yet determined in this givenness. In this context, the givenness of the object is canceled and intuitive givenness acquires an epistemic meaning through the determination that comes from thinking. As a natural consequence, this interpretation transforms space and time, which are forms of intuition, into categorical hypotheses of thinking. The only basis that Neo-Kantians find for this approach from Kant is Kant's statement in the second edition of the CPR that thinking determines intuition. It seems that the Neo-Kantian approach, which makes psychologism and subjectivity identical, sacrifices Kantian subjectivity in the name of this identity. Therefore, intuition, which immediately relates knowledge to the object, is bracketed. The subject's construction of the object of knowledge is tied to the category of determination, and thus the subject is placed under the object-determining power of thinking. Here, a hierarchical relation between thinking and intuition is assumed and thinking is made superior to intuition in this relation. In this way, the epistemic object is grounded not as a construction process that begins with the element of intuition, but in the field of determination provided by thinking, which is superior to intuition. Space and time are thus transformed as fundamental hypotheses of thinking into categories that are projected from determinative thinking toward the object.

## **DISCUSSION**

But what possibilities lie in Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* in Heidegger's ontological interpretation? *Prote metaphysica* implies that the collective life and natural sphere of beings are constructed on the basis of a subjectivity that precedes these spheres. The object is assimilated into the whatness of subjective *aisthesis* and subjective thinking. More precisely,

the object is conceived as adapted to the whatness of the conditions of *aisthesis* and thinking of subjectivity that precede experience. *Prote metaphysica* is object-containing subjectivity. Here, the inner possibility of ontology is the coincidence of the being of beings with the being of the subject. That is, the object-ness of objects is constructed as representation through the beingness of subjectivity. The object contained by pure intuition and pure concept is unveiled and discovered by representing it under the conditions of the whatness of subjectivity. This discovery results in the represented object being organized and determined as beings by this antecedent ontological structure in the sphere of ontic experience and nature. *Prote metaphysica* offers the inner possibility of determining subjectivity as the ontological center. In other words, it contains the inner possibility of something like ontology itself on this plane.

However, here we need to follow the traces of Heidegger's ontological interpretation in the CPR. According to Heidegger's interpretation, ontology is essentially unity. This unity reveals ontological knowledge as the result of the unity between intuition and thinking. Heidegger focuses on the root that Kant left unclear. What is this unknown root of the two sources? Heidegger considers this root in the unifying field of unity provided by the act of synthesis. That is, the two sources are combined in a reduction to the condition of a third field provided by the synthesis. Intuition and thinking are related to each other through reciprocal determination and undergo a heterogeneous evolution that suspends their homogeneity in a correlation.

But can the interpretation of the whole structure of Kantian subjectivity as temporality on the basis of all these sources prove that Kantian philosophy is essentially an ontology? Is it appropriate here to think that Heidegger, in this case, transfers the context he sets forth in B&T to Kantian subjectivity and makes a forced correspondence with it? Heidegger explicitly asserts that the meaning of the being of the beings which are called Dasein is temporality. (Heidegger, 1985, 38). Heidegger considers the primordial ontological basis of Dasein in temporality. (Heidegger, 1985, 277). Temporality makes the unity of existence and facticity possible. Temporality is not something that exists as a beings, it temporalizes itself. (Heidegger, 1985 376-7). The multiplicity of Dasein's modes of being, that is, the possible infinity of its ontological unfolding towards the world, becomes possible on the basis of the occurrence of temporality. In other words, temporality is not something produced by time, but rather an ontological priority that makes something like time possible. That is, temporality is the

possibility of Dasein's essential totality. So Dasein is aware of time. The possibility of being in the world of which Dasein is aware and time are so close that Dasein has begun to calculate this awareness with time, which is the closest thing to this awareness. Because according to Heidegger, Dasein does not have to carry a clock because it is the clock itself. (Heidegger, 1985, 469). Therefore, it is impossible to try to determine time in either the subject or the object because, according to Heidegger, it is present neither in the "object" nor in the "subject". Heidegger's proposition, which determines Dasein as time itself, can be seen as contradictory by asserting that it is not in the subject. But this subject here is the subject of traditional metaphysics. The temporality of Dasein expresses a mode of dynamic existence that transcends the subject-object correlation. Time is neither "inside" nor "outside" any kind of subjectivity and objectivity, nor does it exist earlier than them. Because time is the condition of possibility even of that "earlier" becoming. (Heidegger, 1985, 472). Therefore, it is temporality that constitutes the being of Dasein.

On the other hand, given both Cohen's and Natorp's interpretation, can the element of intuition be rejected in the doctrine of pure reason? Or can the CPR's shift from subjective to objective deduction give legitimacy to the radical interpretation of Neo-Kantianism? Is the formulation of pure intuition really a fundamental error of the Kantian system? On the other hand, does the priority given to the element of intuition in terms of givenness and purity harm the independence and inner structure of the element of thinking?

The first point to consider is the following: Does Kantian dualism offer us the possibility that the elements of intuition and thinking can be subject to a relation of primacy and posteriority, or that a philosophical preference can be made towards one of these elements? Kant explicitly declared that one of these elements cannot be preferred to the other and that the coalition of the two elements is necessary for the formation of knowledge. However, the mediation of objectivity, that is, the knowledge of nature as the knowledge of the object of experience, and the factor of the faculty of understanding that dictates laws to nature, gives us the possibility to prioritize knowledge of the object. Subjectivity, which constructs the object of experience, carries itself into the objective field. The objective field is revealed on the basis of the operation of universal and necessary principles. It is scientific *Dasein* that operates in the field revealed on the basis of these principles. It is precisely for this reason that Cohen and Neo-Kantianism consider Kantian dualism not as a fundamental cause, but as a means left behind by objectivity,

which is the conclusion of this dualism. In such a way that the knowledge of experience established as knowledge of the object retrospectively cancels subjectivity. This cancellation reveals that the factor of sensibility, which is assumed to be in the initial movement of knowledge, is in fact not in the beginning but only in the end. According to Neo-Kantianism, what we see in experience is the content of experience created by subjectivity. The element that realizes this is the faculty of understanding, the element of pure thinking. This is because sensibility only emerges when the content is formed, i.e. it is an appearance that is added to it later, not at the beginning. Of course, in Cohen and Neo-Kantianism the influence of ancient metaphysics and ontology towards the element of sensibility is evident. Sensibility is provisional and confused. Therefore, purity cannot be attributed to it. It is only *ratio* that is pure.

## CONCLUSION

Kantian criticism as *protometaphysica* means the unilateral irreducibility of the subject. Subjectivity is not an eclectic representation that can be divided among the elements of mere sensibility or mere thinking, but an ontological representation embodied in the unity of the sources that constitute the structural unity of subjectivity. *Protometaphysica* has left us as a possibility the priority of treating subjectivity as an ontological unity. Heidegger's interpretation, again as an overstepping of boundary, is actually softened by this possibility provided by the *protometaphysica* and is in harmony with the textual inner motion of the CPR.

The third pillar of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an ontology is the inquiry of transcendental deduction. The necessary exposition of this part of the CPR has been provided in the previous sections of our study. However, it is still necessary to briefly set out the important points here. First of all, the inquiry into deduction is different in the first and second editions. Heidegger prefers the inquiry in the first edition.

As the primary metaphysics, *prote metaphysica* refers not to a context in which an epistemological representation can be essentialized, but to the primordial plane of knowledge that makes something like epistemology itself possible. Neo-Kantianism suspended Kantian subjectivity through the mediation of objectivity against the danger of psychologism. By utilizing the transcendental concept of Kantian criticism, the Neo-Kantians have seen the surpassing of the subject-object plane in the dimension emerging from the objective

determination of nature. The concept of the transcendental expresses the dual relation of the subject to the object. The subject thinks that the object stands in front of it in its own existence. However, its relation to the object is not realized through this in-itselfness. What it relates to is the mode of knowing the object. So transcendental cognition is the subject knowing how to know the object. In this sense, the object is revealed both by the subject's *a priori* mode of cognition and by a mode of being that is independent of the subject. Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* coincides subject and object in the mode of cognition of subjectivity. But does this mean that the subject only knows the object as a representation in its own mind? This does not seem possible in terms of *prote metaphysica*. Because Kantian criticism as *prote metaphysica* presents the positive and negative whatness of the object in the context of possible experience. The positive whatness of the object shows how knowledge of the object operates in the field of experience through its whatness. That is, the object representation of subjectivity realizes in the field of experience as nature and functions as the constructive element of the human collective world. Neo-Kantians interpreted these constructive elements as the object of scientific knowledge and thought that Kantian criticism constituted the pure foundation of this object of scientific knowledge. The negative whatness of the object is that the object's being-in-itself is inaccessible to subjectivity. That is to say, the ultimate limit of subjectivity's access is exhausted in the being-in-itself of the object.

In Kantian criticism, the discovery of the pre-experiential conditions of the forms of subjectivity also gave the how-ness of the relation to the object. The relation to the object is subject to the purely formal conditions of subjectivity. This subordination has closed the ontological homogeneity of the object to the subject. The object cannot have a pure, ontology in itself in the face of the subject. Thus, the object field cannot contain an ontological method beyond the conditions of appearing to the subject. This is the epistemological condition that Kantian criticism provides for the object field. And any method in which this condition is a premise will emerge as an epistemological method research. No matter how much the sciences determine or investigate it, a chemical element does not have a homogeneous, in itself, pure ontology vis-à-vis the subject. This all-object investigation of the sciences opens up the possibilities of different epistemological methods under the pressure of this condition. The Neo-Kantian interpretation tried to deepen this context. They set the epistemological condition that *prote metaphysica* sets for the object field as the absolute point of Kantian interpretation.



It does not seem possible to argue that there is a possibility to eliminate the element of intuition in Kantian critique. However, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* also offers the possibility of treating the faculty of understanding, which is legislative vis-à-vis nature, as the fundamental basis of experience. For example, does pure intuition have laws? Does pure intuition give us organizing rules in the lawfulness we dictate to nature? Of course not. Pure intuition is the primary structurality of relating to things. That is, it is the formality of our receptivity that precedes objects. Our primordial reception of objects under spatial and temporal forms does not give us their legislative connections, but rather it is how the conditions of their first appearance to subjectivity. This is the point that the neo-Kantians exploit. This is actually related to the call to "return to Kant", which is the opening motto of Neo-Kantianism. But in what context and in what manner has this call to return to Kant emerged? Indeed, one might ask why go back to Kant a century later. In what direction and manner should the content and meaning of this return take place? The main point here concerns the inner movement of the history of philosophy. German idealism and Hegelianism, which emerged after Kant and were the pinnacle of philosophical speculation, reached the last possible limit and began to lose their influence. The loss of this influence is of course related to the development of the positive sciences. The tremendous development in fields such as physiology, psychology, physics and chemistry has brought philosophy back to a position of being ashamed in the face of the sciences. The category of truth is no longer the object of philosophical speculation but of the sciences. It is precisely at such a historical stage that the call to "go back to Kant" should make sense. This call indicates that only through Kant can philosophy, which has regressed in the face of the sciences, be put back on a solid ground. This is because the main cause of Kantian criticism is to re-establish metaphysics as a solid field of knowledge. It is precisely for this reason that the Neo-Kantians believed that the possibility of reconciliation between philosophy and the natural sciences could be re-established on the basis of pure Kantian principles. This is the motivation for their interpretation of Kant as the epistemological foundation of the mathematical natural sciences.

Interestingly, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* presents the epistemological relation to be established with the positive sciences as a possibility in itself. Synthetic *a priori* cognition as the constructive basis of experience is exemplified through mathematics and physical science. And the condition that metaphysics does not exceed the limits of possible experience is tied to the what-ness and how-ness of this cognition.

The Neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant emphasized the factor of the faculty of understanding as the source of synthetic principles in Kantian critique for the sake of the relation of correspondence between sciences and philosophy, and as a natural consequence of this emphasis, they interpreted the doctrine of sensibility not as an independent structure of subjectivity, but as a tool left behind by the subjectivity that established the field of objective experience. That is to say, sensibility is not the beginning of the cognition process, but rather it is coded as a temporary phase that is contextualized by the cognition process established by the principles of the pure faculty of understanding and is deactivated by the determination of the faculty of understanding.

This study considers Kant's philosophy as neither an ontology nor an epistemology. It is a metaphysics of method from which both epistemological and ontological procedures can be derived. But doesn't this seem to express a vulgar view that Kantian critique is both ontology and epistemology? On the other hand, what does this study aim at by purging the term *prote philosophia* from its historical content and calling for help only formally? Can it be considered a contradiction to call for help the term *prote philosophia*, which has already historically become metaphysics after a period of time? When the primary philosophy is already metaphysics, what does it mean to be the primary metaphysics?

Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* does not claim that Kantian philosophy is both an ontology and an epistemology. On the contrary, it claims that it contains the inner possibility of ontology or epistemology centered approaches. Therefore, *prote metaphysica* means subjectivity with object inclusion. The being of beings overlaps with subjective sensibility and the whatness of the conditions of subjective thinking. Subjectivity realizes its ontological structural totality through the possibility of experience it constructs in the objective field. On the other hand, the subject stands as an ontology against the object with the conditions it possesses in itself. More precisely, subjectivity is positioned as an ontological center that includes both the conditions of the whatness of knowledge and the object it constructs according to these conditions. While this is where the accusation of a retreat into the philosophy of subjectivity that is leveled against Kantian critique rests, this is not a world and a field of objects that is imprisoned in the representation of subjectivity. Kantian critique shifted the classical mode of the subject-object equation by recalling the ontological point of departure back to the subject. This recall was realized not by contextualizing the subject, as classical philosophy did,

but by discovering the subject in its pre-contentual formality and in the conditions of this formality that are independent of experience. In other words, Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* is a preliminary metaphysics as the provider of the possibility of positioning subjectivity as an ontological center.

Kantian criticism includes the whatness of the subject, the whatness of knowledge and the whatness of the object. It dialectically connects these ingredients through certain limitations and through certain pure formal subjective discoveries. For example, the condition of the object's whatness and the limit imposed by this condition (thing-in-itself) correspond to a condition simultaneously contained in the subject's whatness and the limit imposed by this condition. His discoveries on the whatness of knowledge overlap with the constitutive pure forms of subjectivity, but these overlaps also have distinctions that can be treated separately from each other. In this way, any investigation that will develop in the contexts of subject-knowledge-object will have the possibility of progressing with the orientations produced by a dialectical mode of relation created by conditions and boundaries and will gain an epistemological or ontological direction according to the point where it initiates the investigation. Kant's discovery of the pure formality of subjectivity is a great discovery in terms of method. For thanks to this discovery, every inquiry has acquired the consciousness of the condition of reflecting on the forms of orientation before determining the object to be oriented towards.

Kantian critique as *prote metaphysica* is the inner possibility of ontological orientation. For *prote metaphysica* points out that the being structure of the subjectivity of the subject is the basis for the relation to beings as the field of nature. That is, the being structure of subjectivity established on the grounds of sensibility and thinking emerges as the holistic inner possibility of determining beings as beings. On the other hand, *prote metaphysica* establishes the objective field of experience in the dimension opened by the transcendental mode of cognition. This field provides the phenomenology of the object of knowledge and the epistemological conditions of subjectivity in the field of experience. *Prote metaphysica* does not imply a separation of the subject from the object, but rather a correspondence with the epistemological conditions that the subject projects onto objects. In this respect, as it exhibits the ontological inner possibility that ensures the identity of subjective faculties with being, it also contains the epistemological correspondence in the field of the object of knowledge and possible experience as a possibility.

Therefore, *prote metaphysica* does not represent a context in which an ontological or epistemological representation can be made an essence or center, but rather as a primary metaphysics that fundamentally contains the inner possibility of ontology and epistemology and in this sense precedes both.

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#### Appendix A: Abbreviations

- *CPR* – Critique of Pure reason
- *CPrR* – Critique of Practical Reason
- *KPM* – Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
- *KTE* – KantsTheorieDerErfahrung
- *LRE* –Logik Der ReinenErkenntniss
- *B&T* – Being and Time

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